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All the ideas for 'Physics', 'Truth-makers' and 'fragments/reports'

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127 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man's chief strength is not being tricked; nothing is worse than error, frivolity or rashness [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
When shown seven versions of the mowing argument, he paid twice the asking price for them [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 4. Divisions of Philosophy
Philosophy has three parts, studying nature, character, and rational discourse [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Someone who says 'it is day' proposes it is day, and it is true if it is day [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Are a part and whole one or many? Either way, what is the cause? [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Geometry studies naturally occurring lines, but not as they occur in nature [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Two is the least number, but there is no least magnitude, because it is always divisible [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Without infinity time has limits, magnitudes are indivisible, and numbers come to an end [Aristotle]
Zeno achieved the statement of the problems of infinitesimals, infinity and continuity [Russell on Zeno of Citium]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / c. Potential infinite
Aristotle's infinity is a property of the counting process, that it has no natural limit [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / j. Infinite divisibility
Lengths do not contain infinite parts; parts are created by acts of division [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
A continuous line cannot be composed of indivisible points [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Ten sheep and ten dogs are the same numerically, but it is not the same ten [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Whatever participates in substance exists [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is the implied actuality of that which exists potentially [Aristotle]
The sophists thought a man in the Lyceum is different from that man in the marketplace [Aristotle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Aristotle's formal and material 'becauses' [aitiai] arguably involve grounding [Aristotle, by Correia/Schnieder]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The separation from here to there is not the same as the separation from there to here [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The features of a thing (whether quality or quantity) are inseparable from their subjects [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Heavy and light are defined by their tendency to move down or up [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
Natural objects include animals and their parts, plants, and the simple elements [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is not predicated of anything - but it still has something underlying it, that originates it [Aristotle]
We only infer underlying natures by analogy, observing bronze of a statue, or wood of a bed [Aristotle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
A nature is related to a substance as shapeless matter is to something which has a shape [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Form, not matter, is a thing's nature, because it is actual, rather than potential [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
A thing's form and purpose are often the same, and form can be the initiator of change too [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Unity of the form is just unity of the definition [Aristotle]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
In feature-generation the matter (such as bronze) endures, but in generation it doesn't [Aristotle, by Politis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
The four explanations are the main aspects of a thing's nature [Aristotle, by Moravcsik]
A thing's nature is what causes its changes and stability [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Coming to be is by shape-change, addition, subtraction, composition or alteration [Aristotle]
Natural things are their own source of stability through change [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
A day, or the games, has one thing after another, actually and potentially occurring [Aristotle]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 10. Beginning of an Object
Coming-to-be may be from nothing in a qualified way, as arising from an absence [Aristotle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Matter is potentiality [Aristotle, by Politis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
Intrinsic cause is prior to coincidence, so nature and intelligence are primary causes, chance secondary [Aristotle]
Chance is a coincidental cause among events involving purpose and choice [Aristotle]
Maybe there is no pure chance; a man's choices cause his chance meetings [Aristotle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception an open hand, a fist is 'grasping', and holding that fist is knowledge [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
A grasp by the senses is true, because it leaves nothing out, and so nature endorses it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
To know something we need understanding, which is grasp of the primary cause [Aristotle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
If a grasped perception cannot be shaken by argument, it is 'knowledge' [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
A presentation is true if we judge that no false presentation could appear like it [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
We know a thing if we grasp its first causes, principles and basic elements [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Science refers the question Why? to four causes/explanations: matter, form, source, purpose [Aristotle]
Four Explanations: the essence and form; the matter; the source; and the end [Aristotle, by Politis]
Aristotle's four 'causes' are four items which figure in basic explanations of nature [Aristotle, by Annas]
There are as many causes/explanations as there are different types of why-question [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Chance is inexplicable, because we can only explain what happens always or usually [Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
When a slave said 'It was fated that I should steal', Zeno replied 'Yes, and that you should be beaten' [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
A dog tied to a cart either chooses to follow and is pulled, or it is just pulled [Zeno of Citium, by Hippolytus]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Incorporeal substances can't do anything, and can't be acted upon either [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
A body is required for anything to have causal relations [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
You can't abstract natural properties to make Forms - objects and attributes are defined together [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematicians study what is conceptually separable, and doesn't lead to error [Aristotle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
A sentence always has signification, but a word by itself never does [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates are substance, quality, place, relation, quantity and action or affection [Aristotle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Zeno said live in agreement with nature, which accords with virtue [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
Since we are essentially rational animals, living according to reason is living according to nature [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
The goal is to 'live in agreement', according to one rational consistent principle [Zeno of Citium, by Stobaeus]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
All moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasure and pain [Aristotle]
Zeno saw virtue as a splendid state, not just a source of splendid action [Zeno of Citium, by Cicero]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Zeno says there are four main virtues, which are inseparable but distinct [Zeno of Citium, by Plutarch]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature is a principle of change, so we must understand change first [Aristotle]
Nothing natural is disorderly, because nature is responsible for all order [Aristotle]
'Nature' refers to two things - form and matter [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Nature has purpose, and aims at what is better. Is it coincidence that crops grow when it rains? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The nature of a thing is its end and purpose [Aristotle]
A thing's purpose is ambiguous, and from one point of view we ourselves are ends [Aristotle]
Teeth and crops are predictable, so they cannot be mere chance, but must have a purpose [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Is ceasing-to-be unnatural if it happens by force, and natural otherwise? [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Continuity depends on infinity, because the continuous is infinitely divisible [Aristotle]
The heavens seem to be infinite, because we cannot imagine their end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Matter desires form, as female desires male, and ugliness desires beauty [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
When Aristotle's elements compound they are stable, so why would they ever separate? [Weisberg/Needham/Hendry on Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
The 'form' of a thing explains why the matter constitutes that particular thing [Aristotle, by Politis]
A 'material' cause/explanation is the form of whatever is the source [Aristotle, by Politis]
Causes produce a few things in their own right, and innumerable things coincidentally [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
The four causes are the material, the form, the source, and the end [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Scientists must know the essential attributes of the things they study [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion fulfils potentiality [Aristotle]
If movement can arise within an animal, why can't it also arise in the universe? [Aristotle]
When there is unnatural movement (e.g. fire going downwards) the cause is obvious [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
There is no void in the cosmos, but indefinite void outside it [Zeno of Citium, by Ps-Plutarch]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The universe as a whole is not anywhere [Aristotle]
If everything has a place, this causes an infinite regress, because each place must have place [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
Place is not shape, or matter, or extension between limits; it is the limits of a body [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
If there were many cosmoses, each would have its own time, giving many times [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
Would there be time if there were no mind? [Aristotle]
It is unclear whether time depends on the existence of soul [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time does not exist without change [Aristotle]
Time measures rest, as well as change [Aristotle]
For Aristotle time is not a process but a means for measuring processes [Aristotle, by Bardon]
Time is not change, but the number we associate with change [Aristotle]
Change only exists in time through its being temporally measure [Aristotle]
Time is an aspect of change [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
How can time exist, when it is composed of what has ceased to be and is yet to be? [Aristotle]
If all of time has either ceased to exist, or has not yet happened, maybe time does not exist [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Time is not change, but requires change in our minds to be noticed [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The present moment is obviously a necessary feature of time [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / h. Change in time
Unlike time, change goes at different rates, and is usually localised [Aristotle, by Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time has parts, but the now is not one of them, and time is not composed of nows [Aristotle]
Nows can't be linked together, any more than points on a line [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / d. Measuring time
Circular motion is the most obvious measure of time, and especially the celestial sphere [Aristotle]
We measure change by time, and time by change, as they are interdefined [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present moment is a link (of past to future), and also a limit (of past and of future) [Aristotle]
We can't tell whether the changing present moment is one thing, or a succession of things [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Since the cosmos produces what is alive and rational, it too must be alive and rational [Zeno of Citium]
Things are more perfect if they have reason; nothing is more perfect than the universe, so it must have reason [Zeno of Citium]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Do things come to be from what is, or from what is not? Both seem problematical. [Aristotle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The source of all movement must be indivisible and have no magnitude [Aristotle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
Rational is better than non-rational; the cosmos is supreme, so it is rational [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
If tuneful flutes grew on olive trees, you would assume the olive had some knowledge of the flute [Zeno of Citium]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 2. Pantheism
The cosmos and heavens are the substance of god [Zeno of Citium, by Diog. Laertius]